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Abstract. This papers discusses the scientific and practical perspectives of us-
ing general game playing in business-to-business price negotiations as a part of
Procurement 4.0 revolution. The status quo of digital price negotiations software,
which emerged from intuitive solutions to business goals and refereed to as elec-
tronic auctions in industry, is summarized in scientific context. Description of
such aspects as auctioneers’ interventions, asymmetry among players and time-
depended features reveals the nature of nowadays electronic auctions to be rather
termed as price games. This paper strongly suggests general game playing as the
crucial technology for automation of human rule setting in those games. Game
theory, genetic programming, experimental economics and AI human player sim-
ulation are also discussed as satellite topics. SIDL-type game descriptions lan-
guages and their formal game theoretic foundations are presented.
Keywords: Procurement 4.0 · Artificial Intelligence · General Game Playing ·
Game Theory ·Mechanism Design · Experimental Economics · Behavioral Eco-
nomics · z-Tree · Cognitive Modeling · e-Auctions · barter double auction · B-
to-B Price Negotiations · English Auction · Dutch auction · Sealed-Bid Auction ·
Industry 4.0
1 Introduction
The ever quest of cost reduction leads nowadays to application of many AI related
technologies in manufacturing. Since 2011 [1], it is commonly termed as Industry 4.0.
Conventional manufacturing is predicted to turn into cyber-physical systems [3]. Those
technologies are robotics, internet of things, smart factory, six sigma, predictive analyt-
ics and similar. Till now, the advancement in application of the AI-related technologies
happened mostly on the manufacturer side.
The buyer side of the process does less progress in this development [9]. The cost
share of supplies for production might amount up to 80% of the gross production value
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on their production factors [2] and up to 66.67% of the turnover [8]. The share of em-
ployees in procurement varies between 0.08% and 2.33%. The task of procurement
is maximum value supply at minimum costs and minimum risks. The performance of
procurement, according to the mentioned figures, is crucial for manufacturing. In the
course of Industry 4.0 development, manual work in procurement is already wished to
be replaced by automation. The goal of Procurement 4.0 is to improve the performance
of procurement and to reduce its costs.
Procurement can be subdivided into following fields:
1) Demand Analysis This is the decision process before the procurement. The com-
pany decides concerning a certain item, whether to buy it or to self-manufacture it
or not to buy it.
2) Supplier Selection
a) Supplier Recruitment Suppliers are found and surveyed. The replied surveys
include major characteristics of suppliers essential for their recruitment.
b) B-to-B Price Negotiations After the supplier recruitment step, the price nego-
tiations start to determine the contract partners. Those are referred to as e-
Auctions.
3) Contract Management Contracts are signed and systematically retained.
4) Order Management Placed orders are systematically recorded. Ordered items are
tracked during delivery and in the buyer’s storage.
5) Supplier Failure Recovery In case of accidental supplier failure, certain emergent
steps are made.
This paper concentrates on 2b – the B-to-B price negotiations. The state of the art of
those negotiations shows features beyond the common usage and scientific notion of an
auction, as the following Section 2 summarizes. These features or rather rule settings
originate from intuitive solutions to business goals. The arising challenges fit into the
subject matter of mechanism design (Section 3). The primary goal of the buyers is to
improve the offer – reduce price and risk. One of the subordinate goals is to shift the
common price expectations on the market by transparency in the bidding process or
in opposite to reduce transparency to keep the prices secret. Also measuring the price
distribution among suppliers might be a subordinate goal. More subordinate goals can
be pursued.
Since the intuitive solutions are done manually and are neither driven by formal
methods nor by data-driven methods, there is huge space for optimization and automa-
tion. This paper proposes a set of technologies to fill this empty space.
The summarized state of the art of e-auctions in 2 does not refer intentionally to
any available commercial systems in order to keep neutrality and avoid distorting the
competition between such systems. Section 3 describes the key concepts of application
of general game playing technology in e-auctions. Section 4 describes the main patterns
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of languages for configuration of e-auctions.
2 e-Auctions’ State of the Art
Sellers offer goods or services. Buyers buy them for certain amounts in a chosen cur-
rency. Depending on how many buyers and how many sellers participate in a B-to-B
negotiation, we categorize it according to Tab. 1. If there is more than one seller, it
is a buyer auction. If there is more than one buyer, it is a seller auction. A unique
seller and a unique buyer are called auctioneers in these two categories. If there are
several sellers and several buyers, it is a double auction. A negotiation without buy-
ers is a barter exchange. There are many internet platforms offering electronic sellers
auctions and buyers auctions, while barter double auction is a promising technology
transfer opportunity [6,4,5]. Procurement uses buyer auctions in order to spark compe-
tition among suppliers, which results in a better offer as the primary goal. A one
Table 1. Categorization of B-to-B negotiations based on participants. The columns define the
number of sellers and the rows specify the number of buyers. Bold category is of interest for
procurement.
Single Seller Multiple Sellers
Single Buyer Bilateral Trade Buyer Auction
Multiple Buyers Seller Auction Double Auction
No Buyers Barter Double Auction
shot buyer auction should result in a victory of the cheapest supplier. This would satisfy
the primary goal of procurement. According to revenue equivalence theorem, whose
first partial publication was made by Vickrey in 1961 [16], only under certain highly
unlikely conditions, differences between rule settings of auctions matter. If rational sup-
pliers determine their minimum price threshold before an auction, English, Dutch and
Sealed-Bid rule-settings would have the same result. Their final bids will be the same.
Obviously, subordinate goals of procurement have major influence on currently used
big diversity of rule setting.
Table 2 shows different types of e-Auctions used in nowadays procurement. Both
the auctioneer and the bidders might wish to know the market price distribution for the
auctioned goods and services. Every auction type provides at least the auctioneer with
the knowledge of the best price and all bidders with the knowledge of their price thresh-
old being best or inferior. Beyond that both the auctioneer and bidders can get also the
full market price distribution of all bidders. Knowing the competitors’ price might have
a long-term impact on the bidders and therefore on the market. The auction types are
grouped into rows according to the transparency for the bidders and marked by text
4 F. Michael and D. Ignatov
style according to the auctioneer’s reception of the market price distribution.
During an action run, the price develops either in the direction of auctioneer’s pref-
erence or inverse to it. If the price grows, it is a forward auction and reverse otherwise.
Sealed-Bid auction has no price development and offers no sight of market prices to
the bidders. In Seal-Bid auction, all bids are final and the auctioneer receives therefore
the market price distribution. The columns of Table 2 group auction types according to
the availability and the type of price development. An available price development can
be driven by the bids or by the system, which runs the auction. In Dutch and Japanese
auctions, the system clock steps the price either forward or reverse. Dutch buyer auction
steps the price forward and inverse to auctioneer’s preference, until one of the bidders
stops it by bidding. All bidders and the auctioneer only see the best price on the mar-
ket through a Dutch auction. Japanese buyer auction steps reverse and in auctioneer’s
preference. The bidders have either to confirm the price every step until only one bidder
remains or to drop out of bidding. This makes the final bid threshold and therefore the
market price distribution visible to the auctioneer and to the bidders.
A bidder driven price development is available in English auction. The last bids are
Table 2. Types of auctions commonly used by industry. The columns define whether the bids’
sequence or something like a ticker drives the price development. The rows define the levels
of transparency for non-winning bidders. The auctioneer sees either no, full or blurred price
distribution.
No price development Bidder driven System driven
No Transparency Sealed-Bid Best/No-Best
Best Price Dutch
Blurred Version Rank, Traffic Light
Blurred Version English
& Best Price
Full Transparency Japanese
not the final ones, since bidders are not rationally incentivised to bid final prices like
in Japanese auction. The bidders see the best price and a blurred version of the market
price distribution. For some subordinate goals, the auctioneer might wish to blur the
transparency for the bidders even more like in Rank and Traffic Light auctions. Rank
auction shows the bidder only the current rank of his last bid among other bidders. If
the bidder can not estimate the best price from his/er current rank development, s/he is
rationally incentivised to bid until his/her final price threshold. Traffic Light auction is
like Rank auction, where the ranks are grouped into colors like green, yellow and red.
This color is then shown to the bidder. This color grouping can also be defined accord-
ing to some thresholds. Best/No-Best auction are like Sealed-Bid auctions, in which the
bidders get a binary feedback and can provide subsequent bids. Further, new and hybrid
auctions can fit into the empty spaces of Tab 2.
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In addition to the diverse auction types, there are also some special features used by
procurement:
Auctioneer’s Intervention In the buyer auction, the auctioneer can stop intervene into
the auction at a certain moment, purchase or break it up. The bid price is binding
for the suppliers, but a winning bid is not binding the buyer for a contract. The
auctioneer also can add more bidders during an auction run or change the duration
of the auction.
Second-Price Almost all auction types can be set to provide the second best bid price
plus small margin as the contract price. Second-Price Sealed-Bid auction is known
as Vickrey auction. This feature assumes the existence of a second bid, which is not
applicable to Dutch auctions.
Multi-Item The total bid price is not given by supplier directly, but consists out of
multiple parts. Buyers apply this feature to acquire information about the partial
costs of a purchase, although there is no rational incentive for the bidders to show
their true cost structure.
Multi-Attribute The bidders submit not only their prices like with multi-item, but also
some additional input. In a Brazilian buyer auction, bidders don’t bid prices at all,
but bid amounts of identical items for a constant total price. The additional input
might consist of attributes of diverse types. For instance, the attribute ’country of
supplier’ might add bonuses or penalties on the total price.
Multi-Lot Multi-Lot auction allows additionally bidding on subsets of items. For in-
stance, Yankee auction is a combination of Dutch auction with multi-lot feature. A
bid in Yankee buyer auction does not stop the auction, if it does not encompass all
the items. The rest will be bidden on at a higher price.
Reserve Prices For buyer auction types, which are not driven by system, maximal bid
prices can be defined and for seller auctions minimal ones. These prices are called
reserve prices. In seller auctions of Internet advertising for instance [15], reserve
prices are used to increase revue in cases with a small number of bidders due to
irrationality of their behavior. Reserve prices hint the expected price level to the
bidders. If there are more than one buyer auctioneer, then the reverse prices will
serve as buyer bids in a double auction.
Asymmetry of Bidders From auctioneer’s point of view, a certain asymmetry between
bidders has to mirrored in prices and price calculation. The asymmetry applies to
reserve prices as well as to Multi-Attribute calculations.
Cascading Auctions Sometimes auctions run as multiple winner auctions and serve as
supplier filters for subsequent auctions.
Variable Ticking The ticking price development in the system driven auctions can be
set to be non-linear and depend on players’ behavior.
3 Mechanism Design and Game Implementation
The features described in the previous section reveal e-auctions as rather general games.
In game-theoretic terms, e-auctions are a subset of n-person games with imperfect infor-
mation. While artificial intelligence research advanced in providing ever improving al-
gorithms for players in games, game theory seeks to find the final solution instead [12].
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A final solution of a game is an equilibrium of players’ behavior strategies, where none
can rationally deviate. Since correct assumptions for human players and correct formal
game-theoretic solutions based on these assumption are impossible to be done without
any data of human behavior, experimental economics runs human subject research to
gather data. Gathered data can be then used to build models of human behavior for an-
alytical solutions and simulations.
Mechanism design is inverse to solving games – there is a desired solution, from
which the appropriate game rules have to be derived. In procurement, we still deal
with human players. Therefore, formal mechanism design would help as less as formal
game-theoretic solution. This constitutes a kind of chicken-and-egg problem – you need
human behavior data to determine appropriate game rules, but human behavior data is
gathered after the game rules are determined. Obviously, one has to start with some
standard or experimental game rules.
Once the game rules are determined, the game has to be realised by software. This
is called game implementation. Current industry practice of e-auctions’ implementa-
tion is the subsequent addition of any new feature and rule by hard-coding development
sprints. Every new feature has to fit well with the previously implemented features.
This approach does not only produce growing maintenance issues, it also poses a clear
set-back for Procurement 4.0:
1. Since the appropriate rule settings depends on yet unknown and future data of hu-
man behavior, one would need a flexible soft-codable e-auctions engine for fast
game implementation. Nowadays hard-code development needs scheduling sprints
and extensive testing.
2. Once an auction is completed, the bidders’ and auctioneer’s behavior data can be
analysed. Analysing data presumes a clear game rule definition, which should be
better written in some soft-code. Game rules can be even processed to automatically
derive game-theoretic solutions [10] and game-theoretic solutions help to shrink the
hypothesis space in data analysis [14].
3. The soft-coded definition of game rules can be provided to the bidders or be a base
for a generation of the bidder welcoming message, e.g., which is written in natural
language. Also, the software testing and quality analysis could be even automatised
with a soft-coded definition of an e-auction.
4. If the bidders will be automatised in future, they would need to figure out the game
rules in order to calculate their bidding strategy. With current hard-code, they will
need either to be programmed in close communication with the platform developers
or be able to analyse the hard-code automatically or be able to run a many epochs
reinforcement learning with a test instance of the e-auctions platform. All these al-
ternatives are obviously worse than soft-coded game definition.
5. The mechanism design is meant to be automatised. There will be an algorithm
which writes and edits a soft-coded definition of an e-auction. For instance, such
algorithm could be based on genetic programming. Certainly, this task will be im-
possible with hard-coding.
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In artificial intelligence, the argument 4 was addressed in more general terms as general
game playing [7]. The goal was to program general game playing algorithms, which
don’t need to be adjusted to every single game. A soft-code definition of a game is sent
to the computational players before the game. At first, the proposed Game Descrip-
tion Language (GDL) encompassed only n-player games of prefect information – no
game information could be hidden from players. Imperfect information was first intro-
duced for general game playing by Strategic Interaction Description Language (SIDL)
in 2009 [11]. Section 4 will introduce the design of SIDL-type languages.
Modeling of human bidders for prediction of outcomes requires data sources. Un-
fortunately, commercial data of procurement e-auctions is not public. The are no non-
profit organisations running platforms for procurement e-auctions. The only data source
available for public research is the data from experimental economics.
4 SIDL-type Languages
SIDL-type languages are based on Prolog syntax. Game description are written using
five main sets of language elements:
1) Definition of roles Game description should be independent of concrete players.
The slots for the players are the roles. Let us consider an example with two bid-
ders and an auctioneer:
role([bidder,1])
role([bidder,2])
role([auctioneer])
2) Definition of database The state of a game is defined as a set of predicate tuples
also called facts. This is the database. The database definition also includes the
starting state definition. Let us consider an example of an auction’s starting state:
fact([auctioncurrency, usd])
fact([rate, usd, usd, 1.0])
fact([rate, eur, usd, 1.1])
fact([biddercurrency, 1, eur])
fact([biddercurrency, 2, usd])
fact([reserve, 1, 10.00])
fact([reserve, 2, 20.00])
fact([starttime, "20.10.2019 12:32:00"])
fact([bestbid, null, 100000, "20.10.2019 12:32:00"])
3) Database update rules The rules of database update will retract and/or assert predi-
cate tuples, if certain conditions apply. The conditions include either system-driven
events or submitted players’ commands. An example rule for reverse price English
auction:
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rule([bidding, B]) <-
fact([reserve, B, Y]),
command([bidding, bidder, B, X]),
X < Y, // lower than the reserve price
fact([bestbid, _, Z]),
fact([auctioncurrency, C]),
fact([biddercurrency, B, CC]),
fact([rate, CC, C, R]),
XX is X * R, // currency rate calculation
XX < Z, // lower than the last bid
retract([lastbid, B, _]), // remove any own last bid
retract([bestbid, _, _]) // remove the best bid
assert([bestbid, B, XX]), // add the new best bid
assert([lastbid, B, X, ctime]).// add new own last bid
4) Database visibility definition There are rules which define visibility of the database
to the players. An example for a Best/Not-Best-Auction:
hidden([bestbid, B, _],[bidder,BB]) <- not(B = BB).
5) Update rules’ availability Rules become available and therefore the commands be-
come available under certain conditions. An example for the starting and ending
states of an auction:
available([bidding, _]) <-
fact([starttime, T]),
ctime > T,
fact([lastbid, _, _, TT]),
ctime < T + "5m". // stop 5 minutes after the last bid
Once a description of an auction is written in SIDL, one needs a piece of software
called game management. Game management is separately maintained to the bidders,
the auctioneer and especially the human computer interface. Game management is typi-
cally implemented as a server, which runs on a description of an auction. Time is a very
important aspect in game management. There are basically two ways to introduce time
into generic game management. These are Alg. 1 and Alg. 2.
Alg. 1 is based on a chronon, which is waited to receive multiple commands from
the players. A chronon is a computer science analogue of a time quantum. All com-
mands received during a chronon are considered to be simultaneous. Alg.2 is based on
interrupts. No commands are considered to be simultaneous. There is succession be-
tween the commands. Obviously, a real world application requires a combination of
both approaches in order to reduce the disadvantages.
Time aspects have also major impact on imperfect information. The game-theoretic
notion of perfect recall from Def. 1 has to be extended for timed aspects. Different time
spans between game events can make hidden information deducible. Def. 2 introduces
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Algorithm 1: Chronon-based game management algorithm.
1 send_game_rules;
2 prepare_database;
3 while any_available_update_rules_exist do
4 send_available_commands_to_players;
5 while chronon do
6 receive_commands_from_players;
7 end
8 update_the_database;
9 record_database_changes;
10 send_visible_changes_to_players;
11 end
Algorithm 2: Interrupt-based game management algorithm.
1 send_game_rules;
2 prepare_database;
3 while any_available_update_rules_exist do
4 if interrupt_caused then
5 update_the_database;
6 record_database_changes;
7 send_visible_changes_to_players;
8 send_available_commands_to_players;
9 end
10 end
10 F. Michael and D. Ignatov
the notion of perfect timed recall as the reference to this problem.
Definition 1 (Perfect recall). In a game tree of multiple paths, where junctions are
caused by system events and player turns, perfect recall refers to the assumption that
every player remembers all previous visible game states and never confuses different
paths.
Definition 2 (Perfect timed recall). In a game tree of multiple paths, perfect timed
recall refers to the assumption of perfect recall together with the assumption that ev-
ery player remembers time spans between all previously visible game states and never
confuses paths of different time duration. [13, p.76]
One should note that the database of a running auction does not include information
about its previous state. Alg. 1 (line 9) and Alg.2 (line 6) cover this aspect. The purpose
of game database is to ensure a correct game state, while the external auction recording
database gather data, for example, for subsequent contract management.
5 Conclusion
This paper presented the future innovation trajectory for e-auctions development in Pro-
curement 4.0 revolution. The key technology for flexible e-auctions configuration al-
ready exists as general game playing. Unfortunately, field data is unavailable for public
research. While it is clear that public research in this domain has to rely on laboratory
data collection technologies.
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